What quantum computing actually breaks
Two quantum algorithms matter, and they do very different amounts of damage. Conflating them is the most common source of bad migration plans.
| Algorithm | Effect | What it means for you |
|---|---|---|
| Shor's algorithm | Factors integers and computes discrete logarithms in polynomial time | Breaks RSA, DSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ECDH, and finite-field Diffie-Hellman outright. These need replacing, not resizing. |
| Grover's algorithm | A quadratic speedup on unstructured search | Halves the effective strength of symmetric primitives — AES-128 drops to roughly 64-bit security. Mitigated by larger parameters, not replacement. |
Harvest now, decrypt later
HNDL is the reason post-quantum migration is urgent before any quantum computer exists. An adversary records your encrypted traffic today, stores it cheaply, and decrypts it years later once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available.
If the data inside is still confidential at that point — health records, financial data, state secrets, long-lived credentials, source code — the breach happened the day it was harvested, not the day it was decrypted. Nothing was "hacked" today, and that is precisely what makes it easy to under-prioritize.
Three conditions have to hold at once for a flow to be genuinely HNDL-exposed, and all three are needed — which is why algorithm counts alone are a poor prioritization signal:
- 1The cryptography is quantum-vulnerable — a Shor-breakable key establishment protects the flow.
- 2The traffic is harvestable — a passive collector can actually capture it. Internet-exposed beats partner-exposed beats internal-only; not harvestable means never HNDL-relevant, no matter how weak the algorithm.
- 3The data still matters later — its confidentiality lifetime extends past the point where the cryptography becomes breakable.
The Mosca inequality
The third condition has a standard formulation: act now if X + Y > Z.
| Term | What it is |
|---|---|
| X | Confidentiality horizon — how many years the data must stay secret. Patient genomes: decades. Session tokens: hours. |
| Y | Migration time — how many years your organization needs to migrate the affected cryptography. |
| Z | Time to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC). |
Read it as a race. If the years your data must remain secret plus the years it takes you to migrate exceed the years until a CRQC, then traffic harvested today will still matter when it becomes breakable — the exposure already exists, even though the decryption capability does not.
Practical rule of thumb, independent of any product: if your data confidentiality lifetime exceeds roughly 5–10 years, start migrating now.
What replaces what
NIST standardized the first post-quantum replacements in August 2024. RelixQ names concrete targets rather than telling you to "use PQC".
| Standard | Algorithm | Replaces |
|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM (formerly Kyber) | RSA key transport, ECDH and DH key agreement |
| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA (formerly Dilithium) | RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA signatures |
| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) | Signatures, where a conservative hash-based construction is preferred |
| NIST SP 800-208 | LMS / XMSS / HSS | Code and firmware signing (stateful hash-based) |
Regulatory clocks
The Mosca inequality gives a per-data-flow answer to "when?". Mandates give a calendar answer. For most organizations the harvest-now horizon binds earlier than any regulator does.
| Authority | What it requires | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8547 | 112-bit-security classical asymmetric algorithms — RSA-2048, ECDSA P-256 — deprecated, then disallowed | Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035 |
| NSA CNSA 2.0 | PQC for US National Security Systems | 2030–2033 |
| BSI (Germany) | PQC for federal and critical infrastructure | 2026–2030 |
| EU NIS2 | Quantum-readiness reporting for essential and important entities | In force |
| EU DORA | Crypto-agility evidence for ICT risk management | In force |
Mapping RelixQ output onto these frameworks is covered in Standards and compliance.
The honesty stance
That stance has two practical consequences you will meet on every screen and in every export. First, claims are typed: proven (a reproducible classical break in a local sandbox), modeled (a dated exposure window or a cited cost estimate, nothing executed), or observed (a read-only negotiation fact). Second, absent data is shown as absent: a scope that has never been scanned reads Not yet assessed, never 100 and never green.
Related pages
The CryptoFinding contract
The single schema every scanner normalizes to before its output crosses a boundary — the reason evidence from code, dependencies, TLS, cloud, and runtime composes instead of fragmenting.
Glossary
Every term the products use — quantum concepts, NIST algorithms, RelixQ constructs, formats, and platform mechanics — defined precisely, with the product each applies to.
QAST: Quantum Exposure Assessment
The adversary-validation layer: HNDL exposure classification via the Mosca inequality, attack-path projection, consent-gated read-only probing, remediation lifecycle, PTES/NIST reports, retest, and the PQC compatibility lab.