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Security model, tenancy and data handling

The intended tenant-isolation design, the two collection paths into the managed SaaS service, credential handling, active-probing consent, and the boundary between product architecture and production-verified assurance claims.

Isolation design
Org scope + RLS
Transport target
TLS 1.3
Collection paths
CLI/CI + managed
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Tenant isolation

Because Enterprise is a multi-tenant managed service, organization isolation is the load-bearing design requirement. Application scope, stored artifacts, background work, and database row-level security are intended to reinforce the same boundary. The Trust Center, not this architecture guide, is authoritative for production verification status.

  • API and session design is organization-scoped. The active organization is carried in the session context and membership is rechecked by protected application workflows.
  • PostgreSQL row-level security is the database boundary in the target architecture. Production enablement and effectiveness remain part of the control review published in the Trust Center.
  • Stored files and background work carry organization context. Reports, exports, and queued scan jobs are designed to retain that scope through processing and delivery.

Switching organizations is designed to re-issue the active organization context rather than granting ambient cross-organization access.

Two collection paths into RelixQ SaaS

SurfaceWhat crosses the wire
CLI and CI submissionFinding metadata, matched evidence snippets, and only the artifacts the customer explicitly selects for submission.
Managed repository connectionCustomer-authorized repository content is retrieved by RelixQ SaaS for the requested scan under the authorized connection scope; final retention and deletion commitments remain governed by the approved schedule and applicable agreement.
The finding contractThe normalized finding carries location, classification, confidence, and the matched evidence snippet rather than a full source file.
The AI explanationThe target AI explanation flow uses selected finding metadata rather than full source files by default. Exact fields, provider, retention, region, and customer controls remain under review in Trust Center: AI.
The QAST active probeRead-only handshake observation. No application payloads are ever sent, nothing is mutated, and the run auto-halts at any third-party boundary.

Credential handling

CLI tokens
relixq login runs the device-code flow — you approve in a browser, and no password is typed into the terminal. Tokens are stored in the OS keychain, never on disk in plain text.
API keys
Created with a name, an explicit scope set, and an optional expiry. The full key is displayed once; only a hash is stored. Revocation is immediate through the JTI blacklist, not deferred to expiry.
Integration secrets
Sink credentials are written to the secret store and referenced by name. The raw secret is never persisted in the connection record and is never displayed back.
GitHub App keys
The App private key lives in the secret store. The token broker signs App JWTs, mints short-lived installation tokens, and caches them for 50 minutes.
Password storage
Argon2 hashing, a 12-character minimum with strength checking, lockout after 10 failed attempts, and full session revocation on password reset.

Inbound request verification

PathVerification
Runtime telemetry ingestHMAC-SHA256 signed headers: X-Relixq-Org, X-Relixq-Timestamp, X-Relixq-Nonce, X-Relixq-Signature. Timestamp and nonce bound replay.
GitHub App webhooksHMAC-SHA256 with a constant-time compare, plus delivery-id replay protection and fast-ack queueing.
Slack interactivitySlack signing-secret verification with a 5-minute replay window, checked before any state change.
GitHub Issues status syncRequired HMAC (X-Hub-Signature-256).
Jira / Linear / ServiceNow status syncOptional shared-secret HMAC. Webhooks for tickets the service did not create are logged and ignored.
Azure Boards status syncNo signature available from the provider — restrict at the network layer.

Auditability

  • Findings are immutable facts. You never edit a finding, you supersede it. Triage state lives on separate rows, so the trail reconstructs what was known and decided at each point in time.
  • The audit chain is hash-linked and verifiable. GET /api/v1/audit/verify-chain checks its integrity independently of the application.
  • Closure requires evidence. In the QAST remediation lifecycle, verified fixed and accepted risk both require a rescan or retest confirmation, a scoped exception grant, or a documented compensating control — with a reference an auditor can follow.

The platform own cryptography

A product that detects post-quantum risk should not become a source of it. The target SaaS architecture applies the same crypto-agility principles, while production-verified control claims remain governed by the Trust Center:

  • TLS 1.3 target for service-to-service transport.
  • Hybrid PQC key exchange target where the platform SDK supports it — the same transition the product recommends.
  • Swappable signing and hashing abstractions, so the platform can change algorithms without a rewrite. This is the crypto-agility it measures in your code.
  • Zero-trust service posture by design — row-level security, JWT validation against published JWKS, and mTLS between services.

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