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Course outline

Deciding

The exposure window and Mosca's inequality

How to combine confidentiality lifetime and migration time into an exposure window, using Mosca's inequality as a planning heuristic, not a measurement.

5 min read

What you'll be able to do

  • State Mosca's inequality and what each variable (X, Y, Z) represents.
  • Explain why Z cannot be measured and why the inequality is a heuristic, not a prediction.
  • Compute whether a scenario is already late, given X, Y, and Z.

The four variables from Module 2 answer whether a specific piece of data is exposed at all. This lesson adds the timing question: given that exposure, how urgently does it need to be fixed? Michele Mosca's formulation gives a simple way to reason about that: act now if X + Y > Z.

X
Required secrecy lifetime — the confidentiality lifetime from Module 2, measured forward from today.
Y
Migration time — how long it will actually take to identify, replace, and verify the protecting cryptography for this data flow.
Z
Time until a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists — unknown, and not something this course, or anyone, can measure.
  1. 01

    Estimate X

    Take the confidentiality lifetime established in Module 2, measured from today, not from when the data was created.

  2. 02

    Estimate Y

    Ask the team that would actually do the migration how long discovery, replacement, and verification would take for this specific flow — not a generic program estimate.

  3. 03

    Treat Z as unknown

    No credible source can state a date for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. Use Z as a labeled, contested planning input, never as a fact plugged into a spreadsheet.

  4. 04

    Compare, and date the verdict

    If X + Y is large relative to any plausible Z, treat the flow as already late and prioritize it. Record the date of the verdict and the confidence behind X and Y, since either can change before Z ever resolves.

The practical effect is that X and Y do almost all of the work, because they are the only two variables anyone can actually estimate with any confidence. Long confidentiality lifetimes and slow migration paths are what turn a theoretical exposure into an urgent one, independent of whatever Z eventually turns out to be.

Knowledge check

A data class must remain confidential for 12 more years (X). The team estimates migration of its protecting cryptography would take 3 years once started (Y). No one can state a credible value for Z, the time until a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists.

What is the defensible conclusion under Mosca's inequality?

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