HNDL Fundamentals · Final assessment

14 questions, 80% to pass

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Question 1 of 14

A junior engineer says: "We don't need to worry about post-quantum migration because no quantum computer that can break our encryption exists yet."

What is the most accurate response, given HNDL?

They're right; nothing needs attention until such a machine existsThey're missing that HNDL risk depends on when data is captured and how long it must stay confidential, not on whether a quantum computer exists todayThey're right for encrypted data, but wrong for digital signaturesThey're wrong only because a quantum computer already exists

Question 2 of 14

Which statement about cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) is accurate?

A CRQC is expected within the next few years based on current qubit countsNo CRQC exists today, and no credible source can state when one will existA CRQC already exists in limited government useCRQC timelines can be reliably estimated from published qubit counts

Question 3 of 14

A document management system stores digitally signed contracts. An adversary captures a copy of a signed contract today.

Which statement correctly describes the risk?

The adversary could forge a new version of the contract once a CRQC exists, invalidating the original signatureThe already-verified signature on the captured contract cannot be retroactively forged; the risk is to future signatures the signing key produces, not to the captured document's past validityThere is no risk at all, because signatures are never affected by quantum computingThe contract's content becomes unreadable once a CRQC exists

Question 4 of 14

A service protects data with AES-256 for storage, but establishes the encryption key using RSA key transport, and that RSA-wrapped key exchange is visible to a network observer.

What accurately describes this service's exposure?

Not exposed, because AES-256 is unaffected by any quantum algorithmExposed, because Shor's algorithm breaks the RSA key transport outright, regardless of the strength of the AES key it deliversExposed, because Grover's algorithm halves AES-256 to the strength of AES-128Not exposed, because RSA key transport is not vulnerable to quantum attack

Question 5 of 14

A team states that their protocol is safe from HNDL because it uses ephemeral Diffie-Hellman parameters for every session, a form of forward secrecy.

Is this claim correct?

Yes, forward secrecy fully prevents HNDL regardless of the key exchange algorithmNo — forward secrecy protects against compromise of a long-term key, but the ephemeral classical Diffie-Hellman handshake itself can still be recorded and later broken by Shor's algorithmYes, because ephemeral keys are never quantum-vulnerableNo, because forward secrecy always increases HNDL exposure

Question 6 of 14

A CDN provider announces that it now negotiates `X25519MLKEM768` by default for supporting clients.

What is the most accurate implication for HNDL?

Traffic that negotiates this hybrid group is protected against future decryption via the classical mechanism, since it stays confidential unless both the classical and post-quantum mechanisms are brokenThis fully resolves all quantum risk for the connection, including authenticationThis has no effect on HNDL, because hybrid key exchange is purely experimentalThis only matters once a CRQC exists

Question 7 of 14

A dataset must remain confidential per policy for 25 years from its creation date. It was created 10 years ago.

What is its remaining confidentiality lifetime (X) for HNDL purposes today?

25 years10 years15 years0 years, since 10 years have already passed safely

Question 8 of 14

Customer records are stored only on an internal system with no network exposure, no backups leave the building, and no third party ever receives a copy.

How should this data flow be treated for HNDL purposes?

As highly exposed, because customer records are always sensitiveAs not harvestable under current evidence, since no plausible capture surface exists — though this should be revisited if that changesAs exposed only once a CRQC existsAs exposed, because internal systems are never secure

Question 9 of 14

A backup is encrypted with a data key that is itself wrapped by a key-encryption key established through classical RSA. The backup file is stored in third-party cloud storage.

Where should the HNDL analysis actually focus?

On the data key, since that is what directly encrypts the backup contentOn the key-encryption key and how it was established, since wrapping relocates the question to whichever key ultimately protects the chain, and that key here is quantum-vulnerableNowhere, since the backup is already encrypted and therefore safeOn the cloud provider's physical security, since that is unrelated to cryptography

Question 10 of 14

An architecture diagram lists a partner connection as 'encrypted with TLS,' with no further detail recorded.

What should happen before this flow can be scored for HNDL exposure?

Nothing further — 'encrypted with TLS' is sufficient to conclude the flow is protectedConfirm the actual key-exchange mechanism negotiated by the live connection, since TLS alone does not indicate whether it is classical-only or hybridAssume the flow is exposed, since TLS is deprecatedAssume the flow is not exposed, since TLS is always hybrid

Question 11 of 14

Two analysts disagree: one wants to record an unconfirmed vendor's key exchange as 'hybrid' because that is increasingly common; the other wants to record it as 'unknown, low confidence' until the vendor responds.

Which approach is defensible?

Recording it as hybrid, since that reflects the industry trendRecording it as unknown with low confidence, and using the more exposed assumption for any decision made before the vendor respondsRecording it as classical-only permanently, since vendors rarely update security review answersLeaving the field empty until the review closes

Question 12 of 14

A data class has a confidentiality lifetime (X) of 8 years and an estimated migration time (Y) of 4 years.

Under Mosca's inequality, what does X + Y = 12 years imply?

Migration should begin now unless there is high confidence that Z (time to a CRQC) exceeds 12 years — and no one can state that with confidenceNo action is needed unless Z is confirmed to be under 12 yearsThe 12-year figure is a measured deadline, not an estimateX and Y should be averaged, not added, to get the correct comparison to Z

Question 13 of 14

What is the current status of NIST IR 8547?

A finalized standard mandating immediate deprecation of RSA and ECDSAAn initial public draft proposing deprecation of 112-bit-security classical public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallowing them after 2035A finalized rule disallowing RSA-2048 immediatelyA NIST press release with no proposed dates

Question 14 of 14

A security team is choosing between prioritizing migration of (1) a database of decades-long-retention insurance claims replicated to a third-party analytics vendor over a classical TLS connection, and (2) an internal admin dashboard's session cookies, which live for 30 minutes and never leave the internal network.

Which prioritization is best supported by the four-variable model in this course?

Prioritize the session cookies first, since cookies are a common attack targetPrioritize the insurance claims database first: long confidentiality lifetime, a plausible third-party capture surface, and a classical key-exchange path outweigh the session cookies' short lifetime and lack of external exposureTreat both as equal priority, since both involve TLSPrioritize neither, since no CRQC exists yet

0 of 14 answered. An unanswered question counts as incorrect, so it is safe to submit a partial attempt to see where you stand.